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Abstract 
The  matching  method  for  treatment  evaluation  does  not  balance  selec­
tive unobserved diﬀerences between treated and non-treated.  We derive a 
simple correction term if there is an instrument that shifts the treatment 
probability to zero in speciﬁc cases.  Policies with eligibility restrictions, 
where treatment is impossible if some variable exceeds a certain value, pro­
vide a natural application.  In an empirical analysis, we ﬁrst examine the 
performance of matching versus regression-discontinuity estimation in the 
sharp age-discontinuity design of the NDYP job search assistance program 
for young unemployed in the UK. Next, we exploit the age eligibility re­
striction in the Swedish Youth Practice subsidized work program for young 
unemployed, where compliance is imperfect among the young.  Adjusting 
the matching estimator for selectivity changes the results towards ineﬀec­
tiveness of subsidized work in moving individuals into employment. 
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 1  Introduction 
The matching method for treatment evaluation compares outcomes of treated and 
non-treated subjects, conditioning on observed characteristics of the subjects and 
their environment.  Basically, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) 
is estimated by averaging observed outcome diﬀerences over the treated.  The 
main assumption is that the conditioning ensures that the assigned treatment 
status is conditionally mean independent from the potential outcomes (this is 
usually known as “the Conditional Independence Assumption” or, in short, CIA 
although in fact it respects to the mean; we follow the common practice and call 
it CIA).1 
The method is intuitive, as it mimics randomized experiments:  the distribu­
tions of behavioral determinants and indicators are balanced as closely as possible 
over treated and non-treated, using observational data.  The use of the method 
has improved the policy evaluation practice by clarifying the importance of com­
mon support restrictions for the distribution of conditioning variables.  By now, 
it is a common tool for the analysis of active labor market policies (ALMP) and 
programs (see e.g. the survey in Kluve, 2006). 
A well-recognized limitation of matching is that it does not ensure the bal­
ancing of the distributions of unobserved determinants of treatment assignment 
among treated and non-treated.  If the assigned treatment as well as the poten­
tial outcomes are aﬀected by unobserved characteristics, and if these are not fully 
explained by the set of conditioning variables, the matching may give biased re­
sults. This is a potentially serious concern in the case of the evaluation of ALMP 
for unemployed workers. Observed individual characteristics and past individual 
labor market outcomes may not fully capture individual’s motivation and social 
skills, and the latter may aﬀect both the case workers’ treatment assignment and 
the unemployed individuals’ job prospects.2 
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to derive a simple adjustment or correc­
tion term for the matching estimator for the case where treated and non-treated 
are systematically diﬀerent in unobserved characteristics aﬀecting the potential 
outcomes.  Key to this is the existence of an instrumental variable that aﬀects 
1See  e.g.  Cochrane  and  Rubin  (1973),  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983),  and  Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1998). 
2For example, Card and Sullivan (1988), Gritz (1993), Bonnal, Foug` ere and S´ erandon (1997) 
and Richardson and Van den Berg (2001) argue that this can be expected to play a major role 
in the empirical evaluation of ALMP, and their estimation results conﬁrm this. Van den Berg, 
Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) contain similar ﬁndings for the eﬀect of punitive sanctions 
for welfare recipients. 
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 the treatment decision but not outcome.  In particular, the variable is required 
to shift the treatment probability to zero for a speciﬁc (limiting) value of the 
variable.  This allows for estimation of the mean outcome among controls that 
is free from any selection problem,  which in turn allows for estimation of the 
counterfactual mean outcome without treatment among those who are actually 
treated.  The correction term for selectivity is zero in case of conditional mean 
independence, and this applies if the value of the instrument is observed not to 
covary with the outcome among non-treated individuals.3  With the instrument, 
we can thus test whether the matching method is appropriate (i.e., whether the 
CIA is satisﬁed). 
The method is particularly useful if the policy design contains an eligibility 
boundary restriction in the sense that treatment is impossible if some observed 
variable or characteristic exceeds a certain threshold value, while individuals are 
eligible for the treatment on the other side of the threshold value but they are 
sometimes not treated.  In other words, individuals whose characteristic exceeds 
a  certain  threshold  value  are  not  eligible,  and  this  is  strictly  enforced,  while 
individuals  whose  characteristic  is  below  the  threshold  are  eligible,  but  their 
compliance is imperfect.  Here,  the word “compliance” is used in a statistical 
sense, meaning that individuals who according to the policy design are eligible 
for treatment end up in the non-treated subpopulation. 
This is a relevant setting. It is a common feature of ALMP to restrict eligibility 
to individuals aged above or below a certain age, and/or to individuals with a 
certain minimum or maximum amount of education, and/or to individuals with 
a certain minimum amount of labor market experience (see e.g. Kluve, 2006).4  If 
imperfect compliance among the eligible individuals is selective then the matching 
approach cannot be used. Our approach overcomes this limitation, by exploiting 
the eligibility boundary restriction within the matching framework. 
Our work is in the spirit of Battistin and Rettore (2007), who study the per­
formance of matching within a special discontinuity design where non-compliance 
3Alternative approaches in order to correct matching estimators for selection problems typ­
ically  assume  that  the  relevant  unobserved  variables  have  additive  eﬀects  on  the  potential 
outcomes (see Heckman and Robb,  1985,  and Andrews and Schafgans,  1998).  The popular 
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998) is 
also based on this. By contrast, our approach does not require additivity. 
4Sometimes the boundary restrictions are based on a variable or set of variables that can 
be used as instruments only locally.  This is the case, for example, of employment programs 
establishing  eligibility  on  the  basis  of  unemployment  duration.  In  such  cases,  a  regression 
discontinuity approach may be more adequate if the restriction introduces a discontinuity in 
the participation rate. 
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 aﬀects decisions only on one side of the discontinuity (see also Angrist and Im-
bens, 1991, and Van der Klaauw, 2008, for inference using regression discontinuity 
with imperfect compliance).  However, by exploiting the existence of an instru­
ment we are able to depart from the discontinuity case and focus on global rather 
than  local  parameters.  We  also  develop  a  (global)  test  of  the  matching  CIA 
assumption. 
We empirically assess our approach by evaluating two major ALMP aimed 
at helping unemployed individuals aged below 25 to ﬁnd work.5  First of all, we 
estimate the average eﬀect of participation in the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP) program for young unemployed in the UK on the individual probabil­
ity of ﬁnding work.  Participants enter the program upon reaching 6 months of 
unemployment.  From that moment until 4 months later, they receive intensive 
job search assistance.  The program provides a sharp age-discontinuity design 
in that participation is compulsory for, and restricted to, those aged below 25 
upon reaching 6 months of unemployment.  As such, the inference method that 
we  develop  in  this  paper  cannot  be  applied  here.  Nevertheless,  we  feel  that 
the NDYP analysis is relevant because it allows us to assess the performance of 
matching in a setting where it should correctly estimate the ATT (for an ap­
propriate subpopulation). For the usefulness of our method, it seems reasonable 
to demand that matching performs well in a sharp discontinuity design if the 
instrument is the variable underlying the eligibility. This evaluation can be seen 
as a non-experimental counterpart of LaLonde (1986)’ s validation study with 
experimental data. When we use matching then we obviously do not include age 
in the set of explanatory variables in the NDYP propensity score.  As such, we 
examine whether matching is able to capture the NDYP assignment process that 
in reality is only driven by age at 6 months of unemployment. 
We should emphasize that, in general, if the CIA is valid, matching estimators 
and regression-discontinuity estimators do not necessarily estimate the same av­
erage eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, the latter estimates a local eﬀect for the subpopulation 
of individuals close to the eligibility threshold, whereas the former may estimate 
a global ATT eﬀect for a wider group of treated.  To prevent a misalignment of 
subpopulations, we restrict attention in all analyses to individuals close to the 
eligibility threshold. In order to detect secular eﬀects of age, we repeat the anal­
yses at integer age changes within the set of eligible individuals.  A diﬀerential 
5There is an increasing awareness that youth unemployment may be a serious problem for 
society despite the fact that youth unemployment durations are relatively short. This is because 
of the prevalence of psychological and labor-market scarring eﬀects which may have long-run 
implications for the productivity of those aﬀected (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2003). 
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 eﬀect for e.g. those aged 23.99 and those aged 24.01 should be taken into account
 
when exploiting the eligibility threshold at age 25. 
Next, in our second empirical evaluation, we estimate the average employ­
ment eﬀect of participation in the Swedish Youth Practice (YP) subsidized work 
program for young unemployed.  This program is designed for short-term unem­
ployed individuals aged below 25.  The program is not compulsory,  being one 
among a number of alternative treatments.  This means that compliance is im­
perfect on the lower side of the age-eligibility threshold. We may therefore apply 
our selectivity-adjusted matching estimator.  The subpopulation of non-treated 
includes those below 25 who do not participate as well as those above 25. In fact, 
participation is not sharply discontinuous at age 25 but declines shortly before 
age 25.  This is not a problem for our method but would complicate the use of 
regression-discontinuity methods. 
Both the British NDYP and the Swedish YP have been evaluated before, in 
a range of studies (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2004, De Giorgi, 2005, Larsson, 2003, 
and Forslund and Nordstr¨ om Skans, 2006, for results and overviews of results).6 
It is of particular interest that the YP evaluations are based on the matching 
approach and that we ﬁnd that adjusting the matching estimator for selectivity 
changes the results towards ineﬀectiveness of YP. 
In Section 2 we develop a formal framework for the analysis.  We deﬁne the 
objects  of  interest  and  we  derive  the  selectivity-adjusted  matching  estimator. 
In Sections 3 and 4 we evaluate the British NDYP program and the Swedish 
YP  program,  respectively.  Section  5  discusses  our  results  within  the  existing 
literature. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Inference 
We adopt standard counterfactual notation where Y0 and Y1 are individual coun­
terfactual outcomes associated with being assigned to non-treatment and treat­
ment, respectively. The binary indicator D denotes the actual treatment status. 
The vector X contains conditioning variables. 
Suppose there exists an instrumental variable Z satisfying the following con­
ditions, 
1.  Y0 ⊥ Z | X; 
6See White and Knight (2002), for an explicit descriptive comparison of the NDYP and YP 
programs. 
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 2.  There exists a set of points {z  ∗ ,z  ∗∗} in the domain of Z where P [D = 0 | X, Z = z  ∗] = 
1 and 0 < P [D = 0 | X, Z = z  ∗∗] < 1. 
In this case, 
E [Y0 | X] =  E [Y0 | X, Z] 
=  E [Y0 | X, Z, D = 0] P [D = 0 | X, Z] + 
E [Y0 | X, Z, D = 1] P [D = 1 | X, Z] . 
Since this relationship holds for all possible values of Z,  and in particular for 
Z = z  ∗, it yields 
E [Y0 | X] = E [Y0 | X, Z = z 
∗ ,D = 0] . 
On the other hand, 
E [Y0 | X] =	  E [Y0 | X, D = 0] P [D = 0 | X] + 
E [Y0 | X, D = 1] P [D = 1 | X] 
which then implies, 
E [Y0 | X] − E [Y0 | X, D = 0] P [D = 0 | X]
E [Y0 | X, D = 1]  = 
P [D = 1 | X] 
E [Y0 | X, Z = z  ∗,D = 0] − E [Y0 | X, D = 0] P [D = 0 | X] 
= 
P [D = 1 | X] 
E [Y0 | X, Z = z  ∗,D = 0] − E [Y0 | X, D = 0] 
=  E [Y0 | X, D = 0] +	  . 
P [D = 1 | X] 
(1) 
The matching method assumes the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (1) to 
be equal to E (Y0|D = 1,X). Thus, the CIA assumption holds iﬀ 
E [Y0 | X, Z = z  ∗,D = 0] − E [Y0 | X, D = 0] 
= 0.  (2)
P [D = 1 | X] 
Thus, for as long as there exists an instrument fulﬁlling the assumptions stated 
above we can test the assumption that the bias term in (2) is zero. This is a test 
of the CIA under assumption that an instrument satisfying conditions 1 and 2 
above exists.  7 
7The CIA test proposed in Battistin and Rettore (2007) focuses on the same term as the 
bias term in (2) for the special case of a regression-discontinuity design with one-sided imperfect 
compliance.  Their proposed test is derived in the context of regression-discontinuity inference 
of local average treatment eﬀects. 
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 More in general, our result suggests to use the second term in the right-hand 
side of (1) to correct for the selection on unobservables. This is an identiﬁcation 
result that does not depend on additivity.  By averaging the right-hand side of 
(1) over the distribution of X given D = 1, over the (“common”) support that is 
shared with the distribution of X given D = 0, we obtain the ATT. In Section 4 
we discuss the actual implementation of the estimator in more detail, using the 
example of the Swedish YP program. 
Recall from Section 1 that we evaluate two major ALMP. In the ﬁrst one, 
in the section below, the inference method that we develop in this paper cannot 
be applied because eligibility perfectly predicts participation.  Nevertheless, the 
analysis  allows  us  to  assess  the  performance  of  matching  in  a  setting  where, 
under the hypothesis that the variable Z underlying the eligibility process satisﬁes 
assumption 1, it should correctly estimate the ATT since Z is a perfect predictor 
of the participation status, D. In particular, it seems reasonable to demand that 
matching performs well in a sharp discontinuity based on a variable satisfying 
assumption 1. 
3  Evaluation of The New Deal for Young People 
3.1  The program 
The New Deal is the ﬂagship welfare-to-work program in the UK. It has now 
been running for over 9 years, since the beginning of the Labour government. 
There are a myriad of New Deal’s for diﬀerent groups and addressing diﬀerent 
employment problems. The largest and ﬁrst to be implemented is the New Deal 
for  the  Young  People  (NDYP).  It  is  targeted  at  the  unemployed  of  18  to  24 
years of age who have claimed unemployment beneﬁts (Job Seekers Allowance ­
JSA) for at least 6 months.  Participation is compulsory at reaching 6 months 
in the claimant count, where refusal to participate is sanctioned with temporary 
withdrawal from beneﬁts. 
Treatment is split into three stages.  It comprises a ﬁrst period of up to 4 
months of intensive job search assistance where a personal adviser meets the un­
employed at least fortnightly. This is called the Gateway. For those remaining un­
employed, the NDYP then oﬀers the possibility of enrolling into one of four alter­
native options:  subsidized employment, full-time education or training, working 
on an organization in the voluntary sector and working in an environment-focused 
organization.  Participation in one of the options is compulsory for individuals 
completing 4 months into the NDYP although this does not seem to have been 
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 strictly enforced.  The options last up to 6 months except for education, which 
can take up to 12 months.  The third NDYP stage is a new period of intensive 
job-search assistance for those still unemployed after the options.  This is called 
the Follow Through.8 
The NDYP was introduced in January 1998 in Pilot areas and released nation­
wide in April 1998.  It has now treated around 1.2 million people, some having 
had more then one NDYP spell.  172 thousand new participants enrolled in the 
NDYP during 2006 while the average number of participants at any month during 
that year was 93 thousand. According to the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) statistics, the forecasted expenditure with the NDYP for the 2006-07 tax 
year is of GBP 225 million, excluding administrative costs.9  A large proportion of 
this is unemployment beneﬁts that would be due independently of the existence 
of the program for as long as the individuals remain unemployed.  According to 
the studies by Layard (2000) and Van Reenen (2004), the NDYP seems to be 
cost eﬀective as the social beneﬁts exceed the social costs. Past estimates of the 
impact of the NDYP suggest that the program raises the chances of unemployed 
people ﬁnding a job by around 5% after 4 months of enrolling into the NDYP and 
this eﬀect seems to persist for some time after 4 months.  The beneﬁts brought 
in  by  increased  chances  of  employment  compare  with  the  modest  cost  of  the 
program when net of beneﬁt payments, resulting in a net social beneﬁt. 
3.2  Data 
In this application we use the JUVOS longitudinal dataset.  This is a random 
sample of the administrative data on all JSA claimant spells.  It represents 5% 
of the British population since 1982. The claimant history is recorded with start 
and exit dates and destination on leaving. A small number of demographic vari­
ables is also available, including age, gender, marital status, geographic location, 
previous occupation and sought occupation.  Agents can be followed through all 
their JSA spells as the same group is followed over time, allowing for a detailed 
characterization of the unemployment history. However, information about what 
happens while oﬀ-beneﬁts is scarce.  Destination when leaving is available from 
1996 onwards only and we know of no other transitions if they do not involve a 
8More details on the program can be found in Blundell et al.  (2004), Van Reenen (2004), 
or Dorsett (2006). 
9The tax year is April to March. See DWP (Department for Work and Pensions), 2006, and 
the DWP website for recent oﬃcial statistics on the NDYP. 
8
 claim of unemployment beneﬁts.10 
Estimation uses information  on unemployment spells lasting for at least 6 
months and starting between July (pilot areas) / October (non-pilot areas) 1997 
and December 2003.  We use at most one unemployment spell per individual: 
the ﬁrst long (over 6 months) unemployment spell within our time frame.  Since 
the participants enrolling into options leave the claimant count, it would be dif­
ﬁcult to ascertain the eligibility and participation status of individuals in their 
second or higher long unemployment spell.  Our selected sample includes males 
who complete 25 years of age in less than 180 days of being 6 months into the 
unemployed spell.  The treated (controls) are those aged 24 (25) by the end of 6 
months in the claimant count. 
Table 1 shows the sample size for treated and controls in each 30 days interval 
around the 25th birthday at completion of 6 months into the claimant count. 
Table 1: Number of observations by age group and treatment status. Age groups 
deﬁned by distance to 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in JSA claimant 
count. Men only. 
Distance to 25th 
birthday at 6  treated  controls 
months into U  (under 25)  (over 25)  Total 
� 30 days  241  271  512 
31-60 days  283  290  573 
61-90 days  322  295  617 
91-120 days  300  288  588 
121-150 days  293  316  609 
151-180 days  312  292  604 
Total  1,751  1,752  3,503 
3.3  Estimation procedure 
The compulsory nature of the NDYP and the age eligibility criterion generate a 
sharp discontinuity in participation at the 25th birthday.  This creates the ideal 
setting to assess the adequacy of the CIA in evaluation using as instrument the 
10In total, there are 842 observations we do not know the destination in our sample of 3503 
agents. 
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 distance in days to the 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in unemployment.
 
In the evaluation exercise, we consider two alternative outcomes (Y ): 
•	 the re-employment probability 120 days after enrollment, by the end of the 
tenth month after becoming a claimant or 
•	 the probability of having left the JSA claimant count 120 days after enroll­
ment, by the end of the tenth month after becoming a claimant. 
We  compare  two  alternative  estimation  methods  in  trying  to  identify  the 
average  impact  of  treatment  on  the  treated  (ATT).  The  ﬁrst  is  the  standard 
matching  on  the  propensity  score.  The second  is  the  regression  discontinuity 
exploring the sharp design in age. 
The matching estimates use the whole sampled population of treated/controls 
as described above (24 and 25 years old males at less than 180 days of their 25th 
birthday on completion of 6 months in the claimant count). The propensity score 
is based on all the observed demographic information and a detailed unemploy­
ment history constructed from the historical records in JUVOS. The covariates 
used in matching are marital status, region at 2 digits level (37 regions), usual 
occupation at 2 digits level (77 categories), claiming history over the past 3 years 
and  quarter  of  inﬂow.  We  also  single  out  region  to  produce  a  second  set  of 
estimates based on propensity score matching coupled with exact matching on 
region.  The matching procedure uses Epanechnikov kernel weights and diﬀerent 
bandwidths have been tried. 
Figure 1 plots the pdf of the predicted propensity scores for treated and con­
trols using the full speciﬁcation.11  The two distributions overlap for most of the 
domain. In fact, the observables are nearly balanced across the two groups even 
before matching on the propensity score, with a maximum bias of 8%. Matching 
improves the balancing over half of the observables, namely the ones exhibiting 
larger bias, without damaging the balance of the remaining observables.  In the 
estimation we exclude observations scoring below the maximum 5 centile and 
above the minimum 95 centile of the two distributions.  This amounts to con­
sidering the central part of the distribution, grossly corresponding to propensity 
scores above 0.35 and below 0.65. 
The regression discontinuity estimates explore further the age-cutoﬀ point for 
eligibility.  We use the same kernel weights as for the matching procedure de­
scribed above.  Such weights are then combined with the kernel (Epanechnikov) 
weights for the distance to 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in unem­
ployment.  As we vary the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday, this 
11Estimates of the propensity score can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix. 
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corresponds eﬀectively to changing the treatment and control groups.  We con­
sider multiples of 30 days for the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday, 
from 60 to 180 days.12  We then use local linear regressions (LLR) based on two 
linear models, separately for treated and controls, of the outcome of interest on 
the distance to the 25th birthday at 6 months into the unemployment spell. Es­
timation is by weighted least squares using the weights described above.  The 
estimated impact is the diﬀerence between the intercepts in the two regressions, 
when the distance to the 25th birthday at 6 months in unemployment is zero. 
3.4  Results 
We estimate the impact of the NDYP on the two outcomes of interest, namely 
exits into all destinations and exits into employment within 120 days of joining 
the program.13  Results for the ATT using exact matching on region are displayed 
in table 2. 
Column 1 in table 2 shows estimates of the impact of treatment on the prob­
ability of leaving the claimant count with 120 days of joining the NDYP and 
column 2 presents the respective standard errors. According to the discontinuity 
design estimates in rows 1 to 5, the NDYP seems to have had a positive and 
12Comparisons  using  only  individuals  at  less  than  30  days  of  completing  25  at  becoming 
unemployed for 6 months are very imprecise given the sample size. 
13These estimates are based on exact matching on region and a bandwidth of 0.1 for the 
matching  on  the  propensity  score.  Estimates  using  matching  on  the  propensity  score  only 
and alternative bandwidths show the same patterns and are available from the authors under 
request. 
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 Table 2:  ATT: Impact of the NDYP on the odds of leaving unemployment and 
ﬁnding  a  job  within  120  days  of  completing  6  months  in  the  claimant  count 
(conditional on having completed 6 months in unemployment); men only 
Max dist to 25th btday  Exits to all destinations  Exits to employment 
at 180 days into U  est  se  diﬀ(*)  se  est  se  diﬀ(�)  se 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Regression discontinuity 
(1)  ± 60 days  0.183*  0.081  0.044  0.078  0.123*  0.075  0.073  0.071 
(2)  ± 90 days  0.180*  0.064  0.040  0.060  0.084*  0.057  0.033  0.053 
(3)  ± 120 days  0.177*  0.053  0.038  0.049  0.064*  0.049  0.013  0.044 
(4)  ± 150 days  0.152*  0.048  0.013  0.043  0.072*  0.040  0.021  0.035 
(5)  ± 180 days  0.143*  0.043  0.004  0.038  0.075*  0.034  0.025  0.029 
(6)  Simple matching  0.139*  0.020  0.051*  0.018 
Notes:  The  population  used  in  the  estimation  is  deﬁned  based  on  the  distance  to  the  25th  birthday  on  the 
day 6 months in JSA are completed.  We have considered groups up to 180 days away from their 25th birth­
day.  The simple matching estimates on the bottom of the table are based on this group using exact matching 
on region and propensity score matching on the other covariates with kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.1. 
Regression-discontinuity estimates use LLR on distance to 25th birthday separately on treated and non-treated 
using weighted least squares.  It then compares the predictions of both regressions at the point where the re­
gressor (distance to 25th birthday) is zero to compute the estimated eﬀect.  Simple matching diﬀers from the 
discontinuity design method by not using age information in any more detail than in the deﬁnition of the treat­
ment and control groups.  Bootstrapped standard errors based on 100 replications. 
(�) “diﬀ” in columns (3) and (7) refers to the diﬀerence between the estimates obtained using regression discon­
tinuity and simple matching.  Columns (4) and (8) report the standard errors for the diﬀerence obtained using 
100 bootstrap replications. 
* Statistically diﬀerent from 0 at 5% signiﬁcance level. 
sizeable impact on the probability of leaving unemployment and the estimate 
becomes larger the closer we get to the cutoﬀ point (25th birthday at inﬂow into 
the NDYP). The matching estimator also suggests a positive and large impact 
on the odds of leaving unemployment but the estimated eﬀect is smaller than 
any of the estimates obtained using regression discontinuity. A possible explana­
tion for this pattern is that older individuals are more strongly aﬀected by the 
NDYP. We test the importance of these diﬀerences in columns 3 and 4. Column 
3 presents the diﬀerence between the regression discontinuity and the matching 
estimates.  These are systematically positive and monotonically decreasing with 
the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday.  However, column 4 shows 
that none of these diﬀerences is statistically signiﬁcant. 
Columns 5 to 8 in Table 2 show a similar pattern when exits into employment 
is the outcome of interest. Again, regression-discontinuity estimates are positive 
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 and large, although not as large as the estimates of the impact on the probabilities 
of leaving unemployment. The matching estimate is equally positive but smaller 
than any of the discontinuity design estimates.  This makes the diﬀerences in 
column 7 systematically positive and higher for the older participants, but again 
none of these diﬀerences is statistically signiﬁcant. 
The evidence in this example does not reject the hypothesis that matching 
and discontinuity design are estimating the same parameter.  But this may be 
a consequence of the relatively small sample size and how it aﬀects precision, 
as the estimates do insinuate that diﬀerences may exist between the two sets of 
estimates.  Under the discontinuity design assumptions,  such diﬀerences could 
arise through two channels. First and more obvious, the regression-discontinuity 
assumptions  do  not  imply  the  matching  assumptions.14  If,  in  particular,  the 
conditional independence assumption fails to hold then matching will not identify 
the ATT. And second,  the impact of treatment may vary with age,  in which 
case the eligibility rule eﬀectively creates selection on the potential gains.  Such 
selection  does  not  aﬀect  the  ability  of  matching  to  identify  the  ATT  as  only 
selection on the unobserved part of Y 0 needs to be ruled out. However, selection 
on potential gains correlated with the instrument implies that the discontinuity 
design will identify a local parameter, namely the impact of treatment on the 
treated close to the cutoﬀ point, while matching identiﬁes the global impact of 
treatment on the treated being considered in the evaluation procedure. 
To investigate the importance of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects by age in our 
application, we compute the age eﬀects using a comparison between 23 and 24 
years old males at the enrollment point.  Under the matching and discontinuity 
design assumptions,  any non-zero estimates can only be caused by changes in 
mean gains with age as both groups are to become treated by the NDYP. Table 
3 displays the results.  All estimates are small and insigniﬁcant, independently 
of the outcome of interest (exits to all destinations - columns 1 and 2 - or exits 
into employment - columns 3 and 4) and the estimation method (discontinuity 
design - rows 1 to 5 - or matching - row 6).  It is also much less clear from this 
table that the eﬀects change systematically in the same direction as we include 
14We assume that regression discontinuity is valid under the matching conditional indepen­
dence assumption. This is generally true. To see why, let Z be the instrument (age) and X be 
the other covariates used to perform matching, D the treatment status indicator and Y0 be the 
outcome if the agent is not treated. Now suppose that the regression discontinuity assumption 
does not hold so that E(Y0|X, Z) has a discontinuity at the threshold in Z, in this example 
the 25th birthday.  But Z univocally determines D and so E(Y0|X, D) will not, in general, be 
invariant with D, except maybe for very particular groups where the discontinuity is leveled 
out with observations further away from the cutoﬀ point. 
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 Table 3:  Age eﬀect:  Impact of age on the odds of leaving unemployment and 
ﬁnding  a  job  within  120  days  of  completing  6  months  in  the  claimant  count 
(conditional on having completed 6 months in unemployed); men aged 23 and 24 
only 
Exact matching on region 
Exits to all  Exits to 
Max dist to 24th btday  destinations  employment 
at 180 days into U  est  se  est  se 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Regression discontinuity 
(1)  ± 60 days  0.031  0.057  0.032  0.059 
(2)  ± 90 days  0.012  0.050  0.007  0.046 
(3)  ± 120 days  0.026  0.044  0.020  0.041 
(4)  ± 150 days  0.011  0.038  0.008  0.039 
(5)  ± 180 days  -0.002  0.034  -0.006  0.038 
(6)  Simple matching  0.011  0.016  0.008  0.017 
Notes:  The population used in the estimation is deﬁned based on the distance to the 24th 
birthday on the day 6 months in JSA are completed.  We have considered groups up to 180 
days away from their 24th birthday.  The simple matching estimates on the bottom of the 
table are based on this group using exact matching on region and propensity score matching 
on the other covariates with kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.1.  Regression-discontinuity 
estimates use LLR on distance to 24th birthday separately on 23 and 24 years old using least 
squares with matching weights.  It then compares the predictions of both regressions at the 
point where the regressor (distance to 24th birthday) is zero to compute the estimated eﬀect. 
Simple matching diﬀers from the discontinuity-design method by not using age information 
in any more detail than in the deﬁnition of the treatment and control groups.  Bootstrapped 
standard errors based on 100 replications. 
groups further away from the cutoﬀ point although the estimates in row 1 are 
still higher than any of the other estimates.  In all, however, this table oﬀers no 
indication of possible age eﬀects. 
4  Evaluation of Youth Practice 
4.1  The program 
Youth Practice (YP) is a Swedish large-scale subsidized-work program targeted 
at the 18-24 years old unemployed.  This program was launched in July 1992. 
In October 1995 it was subsumed into an extended policy program for youth 
unemployment. Oﬃcially, eligibility required a minimum unemployment duration 
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 of 4 months for the 20-24 years old and 8 weeks for the 18-19 years old.  We 
restrict attention to the 20-24 years old because of a range of diﬀerences with the 
policy regime for those below 20 (see Forslund and Nordstr¨ om Skans, 2006, and 
the other references in Section 1, for details on YP and youth unemployment in 
Sweden).  Participation was not compulsory.  In fact, YP was one among several 
non-compulsory  treatments  that agents could enter.  The most relevant  other 
possible  treatment  is  Labor  Market  Training,  which  is  an  expensive  program 
that mostly consists of vocational training. 
The YP program was primarily intended for individuals with a high school 
diploma.  Participants were placed in a job in the private or public sector for 6 
months with a possible extension to 12 months. In fact, eligible individuals were 
encouraged to ﬁnd such a subsidized job themselves. While at work, participants 
received an allowance below the current wage rate.  The employer paid at most 
a small fraction of the allowance.  The job was supposed to be supplementary 
in  the  sense  that  it  should  not  displace  regular  employment.  In  addition  to 
work, the participant was also supposed to spend at least four hours per week at 
the employment oﬃce to search for more regular employment. However, the no-
displacement and the job-search requirement seem to have been violated regularly. 
Empirical data show that the eligibility requirement concerning the 4-month 
minimum unemployment duration was not respected:  28% of participants enter 
within 30 days of starting a new unemployment spell, and 68% enter before com­
pleting 120 days in unemployment.  The age eligibility rule, however, is strictly 
respected: participants are always below the age of 25 at the moment of enrolling 
into YP. 
4.2  Data 
We use the Swedish unemployment register called H¨ andel.  This is an adminis­
trative dataset that comprises information from August 1991 onwards on unem­
ployment spells, program participation spells and the subsequent labor market 
status of those who are deregistered (e.g.  employment, education, inactivity or 
‘lost’ (attrition)).  All individuals with unemployment claiming spells since 1991 
are reported in the dataset and their unemployment history can be followed over 
time. H¨ andel also includes demographic information on age, gender, citizenship, 
area of residence and education. 
For the purposes of our evaluation, we use only the ﬁrst unemployment spell 
starting between July 1992 and September 1995, while YP was oﬀered.  In the 
estimation procedure we explore age as the source of randomization by comparing 
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 two closely aged groups:  those aged 24 with those aged 25 at unemployment
 
inﬂow. Our analysis is for men only. 
The sample size by eligibility and treatment status for diﬀerent age groups is 
displayed in Table 4.  Each individual is represented only once in our sample as 
we only consider the ﬁrst observed unemployment spell within the July 1992 to 
September 1995 time frame. 
Table 4:  Number of observations by age group eligibility/treatment status; age 
groups deﬁned by distance to 25th birthday at inﬂow into ﬁrst unemployment 
spell between July 1992 and October 1995; men only. 
ineligibles  eligibles (under 25) 
Distance to 25th birthday  (over 25)  non-participants  participants  Total 
at inﬂow into U  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(1)  up to 90 days  7,163  6,915  138  14,367 
(2)  91-180 days  7,238  6,447  633  14,535 
(3)  181-270 days  7,281  6,145  1,109  14,318 
(4)  271-360 days  7,252  5,988  1,227  14,216 
(5)  Total  28,934  25,455  3,107  57,436 
Notes:  The population is that of males ﬂowing into unemployment between July 1992 and September 1995 
while aged 24 or 25 years old.  The participants are taking YP within 360 days of ﬂowing into unemployment 
without having had another activity (program participation, job or other) since joining the unemployment 
register. 
Column 3 in Table 4 shows that the number of program participants is small 
even though we use the whole population of treated as recorded in the admin­
istrative unemployment records.  The wide availability of alternative treatments 
may explain why the YP has remained a small program while it lasted. Column 
3 in Table 4 also shows that participation is more likely among agents starting 
unemployment spells further away from their 25th birthday. This is a purely me­
chanical eﬀect:  younger agents at inﬂow into unemployment have more time to 
participate while eligibles at the verge of completing 25 years of age at inﬂow have 
just a few days to enrol into the program. As a consequence, regression disconti­
nuity is not ﬁt to deal with this case.  Figure 2 shows how participation changes 
with age at entrance in unemployment and there is no visible discontinuity to be 
explored. 
We measure the impact of treatment on the odds of leaving unemployment or 
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ﬁnding a job after 6, 12, 18 and 24 months of starting the unemployment spell. 
4.3  Estimation procedure 
Estimation uses the population of males aged 24 or 25 at their ﬁrst unemployment 
spell between July 1992 and September 1995. Eligibility is assessed based on age 
at inﬂow into unemployment, where those aged 24 are eligibles and those aged 
25 are not. 
The treated group is composed of the eligibles who select into YP as their ﬁrst 
activity after becoming unemployed.  We consider alternative treatment groups 
depending on two dimensions: 
1.  duration of unemployment prior to enrollment into the YP: up to 0 (many 
individuals ﬂow straight into YP from employment), 30, 90, 180 and 360 
days; 
2.  and distance in days to 25th birthday at inﬂow into unemployment - up to 
180 and 360 days.15 
The control group is composed of eligibles and ineligibles not enrolling into YP 
as their ﬁrst activity within the considered time window.  The precise deﬁnition 
of control group matches that of the treated group in terms of age and allowed 
duration of unemployment prior to enrollment into treatment.  Notice that we 
do  not  require  controls  to  be  under  25  at  inﬂow  (eligible)  as  this  instrument 
15We chose not to tighten this requirement given the small number of treated observations 
close to the age cutoﬀ point (see Table 4 and discussion above). 
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 is used to test the adequacy of matching.  We also do not  require controls to 
remain  unemployed  and  untreated  for  the  length  of  time  the  treated  take  to 
enrol into treatment. This would demand the use of a dynamic framework which 
has  problems  of  its  own  and  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study  (e.g.  Sianesi, 
2004, Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008, and De Luna and Johansson, 2007, deal 
explicitly with dynamic enrolling decisions). 
The standard matching estimates are produced using propensity score match-
ing with kernel Epanechnikov weights.  The propensity score is estimated on all 
observable characteristics excluding age, the selected instrument, namely citizen-
ship, education, region of residence, quarter of entry and labor market history in 
the two years preceding the start of the unemployment spell. 
Estimates of the propensity score when individuals are allowed a whole year 
to enrol into treatment can be found in the Appendix, Table 9.  Figure 3 plots 
the distribution of the predicted scores by treatment and eligibility status for the 
same sample. 
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Distribution of the propensity score by eligibility status
Enrollment into treatment seems to be partly dependent on the observable 
characteristics but eligibles and ineligibles as deﬁned by age at inﬂow are vir­
tually indistinguishable with respect to the distribution of the propensity score. 
This is also true when the treated are excluded from the group of eligibles as 
they are a relatively small proportion of this group.  In fact, the covariates are 
relatively balanced between the treated and alternative non-treated groups, even 
before matching, with a maximum bias of 22%. Matching on the propensity score 
succeeds in improving balancing for all observables, reducing the bias by about 
half of its original level in most cases. 
Estimation of the correction term requires two alternative control groups. We 
use the control group just deﬁned above plus the alternative group of ineligibles 
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 only. Age is the instrument and the 25th birthday is the cutoﬀ point.16  Alterna­
tive deﬁnitions of ineligibles are used to match the deﬁnition of treatment group, 
depending on the distance in days to the 25th birthday.  We then match treated 
with ineligibles using standard kernel matching with Epanechnikov weights and 
used the matched sample to estimate the additional moment required to compute 
the correction term, namely the expected value of non-treated outcomes among 
non-treated ineligibles. 
4.4  Results 
In what follows we discuss the results for the sample of agents ﬂowing into un­
employment within 360 days of their 25th birthday. Results for other tighter age 
groups are similar to the ones we present here. 
Table 5 describes the number of observations used in estimation. Enrollment 
into treatment is much more likely at the beginning of the unemployment spell. 
This is in part a consequence of the deﬁnition of treatment used in this paper as 
being the ﬁrst program the individual participates in during the unemployment 
spell.  However,  participation  is  a  relatively  rare  event  and  so  the  number  of 
participants that move straight into YP from outside unemployment is low.  We 
therefore choose to discuss the impact of participating in YP within 90 and 180 
days of inﬂow into unemployment. 
Table  5:  Sample  size  by  treatment  status  and  deﬁnition  of  treatment;  males 
completing 25 years of age within 360 days of moving into unemployment 
Deﬁnition of  controls 
treatment  treated  eligibles  ineligibles 
treated within 0 days of inﬂow into U  601  27,901  28,934 
treated within 30 days of inﬂow into U  1,125  27,377  28,934 
treated within 90 days of inﬂow into U  2,017  26,485  28,934 
treated within 180 days of inﬂow into U  2,911  25,591  28,934 
treated within 360 days of inﬂow into U  3,107  25,395  28,934 
Table 6 displays the estimates of the ATT on the probability of ﬁnding a job 
with 12 and 24 months of inﬂowing into unemployment. 
16Age is used to deﬁne the eligibility status and to select the working sample only. 
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Table 6:  YP: ATT on the outﬂows to employment; men aged 24 or 25 at inﬂow 
into unemployment 
Days between becoming  Average outcome  ATT  correction  ATT 
unemployed and  treated  controls  (st matching)  term  (corrected) 
enrolling into treatment  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
 
Outcome:  ﬁnding a job within 12 months of becoming unemployed 
(1)  less than 90  0.332  0.335  -0.002  0.049  -0.052 
(0.010)  (0.062)  (0.063) 
(2)  less than 180  0.320  0.330  -0.010  0.028  -0.038 
(0.010)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Outcome:  ﬁnding a job within 24 months of becoming unemployed 
(3)  less than 90  0.468  0.437  0.030*  0.099**  -0.069 
(0.013)  (0.060)  (0.063) 
(4)  less than 180  0.450  0.436  0.014  0.069  -0.055 
(0.010)  (0.048)  (0.049) 
Notes:  Estimates for male aged 24 or 25 years old when enrolling into unemployment.  Eligibility to YP 
depends on age at inﬂow:  unemployed agents are eligibles (ineligibles) if have not (have) completed 25 years 
of age on the day they register as unemployed.  “Treatment” means “enrolling into YP as the ﬁrst program 
during the unemployment spell within some time of becoming unemployed”.  We have considered alternative 
time  windows  for  the  duration  of  unemployment  prior  to  treatment,  namely  90  (rows  1  and  3)  and  180 
days (rows 2 and 4).  The impact of treatment is estimated on the probability of ﬁnding a job within 12 
months (rows 1 and 2) and 24 months (rows 3 and 4) of becoming unemployed.  Matching is performed on 
the propensity score using Epanechnikov kernel weights with a bandwidth of 0.06.  Bootstrapped standard 
errors based on 100 replications in brackets below the estimate. 
* Statistically diﬀerent from zero at 5% signiﬁcance level.
 
** Statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10% signiﬁcance level.
 
Column 3 on the table presents the standard matching estimates of the im­
pact of YP. The estimated eﬀect is small and statistically insigniﬁcant in all cases 
except for the exits into employment within 24 months of inﬂow for those being 
treated early in their unemployment spell (within 90 days of becoming unem­
ployed - row 3).  In this case, matching suggests that the program improves the 
odds of ﬁnding a job by 3 percent.  The correction terms in column 4 are also 
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all but the same case as above, in which 
case there is some evidence of it being statistically diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, 
the correction terms are systematically positive and considerably higher in ab­
solute terms than the estimated eﬀects.  As a consequence, all corrected eﬀects 
become negative (column 5) although none is statistically diﬀerent from zero at 
conventional signiﬁcance levels. 
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Table 7: YP: ATT on the outﬂows to all destinations; men aged 24 or 25 at inﬂow 
into unemployment 
Days between becoming  Average outcome  ATT  correction  ATT 
unemployed and enrolling  treated  controls  (st matching)  term  (corrected) 
into treatment  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
 
Outcome:  leaving unemployment within 12 months of becoming unemployed 
(1)  less than 90 days  0.460  0.512  -0.052*  -0.078  0.026 
(0.013)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
(2)  less than 180 days  0.438  0.511  -0.073*  -0.104*  0.031 
(0.011)  (0.046)  (0.048) 
Outcome:  leaving unemployment within 24 months of becoming unemployed 
(3)  less than 90 days  0.668  0.645  0.022**  -0.070  0.092** 
(0.013)  (0.053)  (0.054) 
(4)  less than 180 days  0.639  0.646  -0.007  -0.077  0.071 
(0.011)  (0.053)  (0.054) 
Notes:  Estimates for male aged 24 or 25 years old when enrolling into unemployment.  Eligibility to YP 
depends on age at inﬂow:  unemployed agents are eligibles (ineligibles) if have not (have) completed 25 years 
of age on the day they register as unemployed.  “Treatment” means “enrolling into YP as the ﬁrst program 
during the unemployment spell within some time of becoming unemployed”.  We have considered alternative 
time windows for the duration of unemployment prior to treatment, namely 90 (rows 1 and 3) and 180 days 
(rows 2 and 4).  The impact of treatment is estimated on the probability of leaving unemployment within 12 
months (rows 1 and 2) and 24 months (rows 3 and 4) of becoming unemployed.  Matching is performed on 
the propensity score using Epanechnikov kernel weights with a bandwidth of 0.06.  Bootstrapped standard 
errors based on 100 replications in brackets below the estimate. 
* Statistically diﬀerent from zero at 5% signiﬁcance level.
 
** Statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10% signiﬁcance level.
 
Table 7 shows similar estimates when outﬂows into all destination is the out­
come of interest.  In this case the standard matching suggest that YP aﬀects 
negatively the odds of leaving unemployment within 12 months of starting, pos­
sibly  detecting  some  lock-in  eﬀect  (column  3,  rows  1  and  2).  The  treatment 
eﬀects on the probability of leaving unemployment within 24 months of entering 
become positive or zero, which is also consistent with the lock-in interpretation 
(column 3, rows 3 and 4).  However, the correction term is now always negative 
and again larger in absolute terms than the treatment eﬀect but generally not 
statistically signiﬁcant with one exception (column 4).  As a consequence,  the 
corrected estimates are always positive or zero and apparently increasing with 
time from entry into unemployment. 
Overall, both tables suggest that matching may not be identifying the correct 
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 parameter although the evidence is not conclusive. Possibly, precise estimates of 
corrected eﬀects require a higher take-up rate than what is found in the YP (see 
ﬁgure 3 for the distribution of the predicted probability of participation).  Since 
the denominator of the correction term is the program take-up rate, by being 
small it introduces signiﬁcant variability in the estimated correction terms and 
corrected treatment eﬀects. 
5  Discussion of empirical evaluation results 
The British NDYP and the Swedish YP have been evaluated before, as well as 
a large number of other labor market programs throughout Europe.  We brieﬂy 
compare our results to the existing literature. 
In the past, youth programs have often shown disappointing results.  Heck­
man,  LaLonde  and Smith (1999)  survey  a large  number of evaluation  studies 
on US and European programs.  Results for the US suggest that labor market 
programs may have no impact or even a negative impact on the employment 
probability and wages of young people.  European interventions seem to have 
been more successful in improving the employment prospects and wages of the 
treated. The disparity of results may be a consequence of diﬀerences in program 
design and/or population of treated.  Labor market programs in Europe tend to 
be larger, more generous and to reach a wider, more heterogeneous population 
than those in the US. The incidence of unemployment is much lower in the US, 
and programs in the US are often speciﬁcally designed to focus on the very disad­
vantaged. Conceivably, these may not be as ready to beneﬁt from treatment and 
may face a stronger stigma from treatment than their European counterparts. 
More recently,  Kluve (2006)’s survey of the evaluation results in Europe ﬁnds 
that young men do not seem to beneﬁt from these interventions in terms of labor 
market outcomes, while young women are found to beneﬁt more frequently. 
The British NDYP has been the focus of several evaluation studies (e.g. Blun­
dell et al., 2004, De Giorgi, 2005). On a more optimistic note, results have consis­
tently shown signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of the program on the employment prob­
abilities of young males. All studies compare unemployed completing 6 months in 
the claimant count. In one set of estimates, Blundell et al. (2004) explore the age 
threshold rule within matching coupled with diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences to estimate 
the impact of the NDYP on the probability of ﬁnding a job within 10 months 
of ﬂowing into unemployment.  De Giorgi (2005) uses regression discontinuity in 
age with a bandwidth close to 180 days to measure the impact of the NDYP on 
the probability of employment 18 months after the start on the unemployment 
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 spell.  His estimates suggest that the program has improved the chances of em­
ployment among the treated by 5-7%, and are in line with those in Blundell et 
al.  (2004) and our own for a similar bandwidth (row 5 and column 5 in table 
2). These results suggest that the mixture of improved job-search assistance and 
tougher job-search monitoring used in the NDYP has helped moving and keeping 
young unemployed out of subsidies in the UK. While it is unclear which of the 
two mechanisms played the most important role, evidence from other European 
countries also hint that such combination may work (Anderson, 2000, Van den 
Berg et al., 2004, and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006, and references 
therein). In terms of our comparison between matching and discontinuity design, 
the results of the three studies taken together further support the claim that the 
careful use of matching in the evaluation of the NDYP has identiﬁed the true 
ATT treatment eﬀect parameter. 
Swedish subsidized work programs have also been the focus of several studies. 
Sianesi (2004) carefully analyzes the overall impact of the Swedish ALMP system 
and the diﬀerential impact of each of the numerous available treatments for adults 
(so this excludes YP). She ﬁnds that subsidized employment is the best performer 
in terms of moving unemployed back into work, and that the positive eﬀect of 
subsidized employment seems to last. All other programs have either a zero or a 
negative impact, possibly arising through the renewed eligibility to beneﬁts as a 
consequence of program participation.  The pivotal YP evaluation is in Larsson 
(2003).  In contrast to Sianesi’s results for adults, Larsson ﬁnds strong negative 
eﬀects of this program on the probability of leaving unemployment within 12 
months of treatment, that then fade to zero after 24 months.  These results are 
more pessimistic than our own although not completely incompatible.  Possibly 
explaining the diﬀerences is the fact that Larsson constructs a comparison group 
conditional on not being treated for the whole duration of the treatment spell. 
But, to put it extreme, this eﬀectively amounts to conditioning on a successful 
outcome, especially in the Swedish system where the decision is between partici­
pating now against waiting a little longer while trying to ﬁnd a job. As has been 
widely reported in studies of the Swedish system (see e.g.  Larsson, 2003), those 
who stay unemployed long enough will eventually participate in one of the many 
treatments available.  If an unemployed individual is observed not to participate 
in a treatment, then this may be to some extent because they manage to leave 
unemployment before participation. 
Our results suggest that YP has no impact on employment outcomes but may, 
in the longer run (after 24 months) lead to (probably temporary) exit from unem­
ployment for other reasons. For example, individuals may move into education or 
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 take further treatment (possibly cycling between open unemployment and treat­
ment to take advantage of the possibility to renew eligibility to unemployment 
beneﬁts through treatment participation). 
6  Conclusion 
We have developed and applied an evaluation method for the eﬀects of program 
participation (or policy exposure) on individual outcomes, if participation is se­
lective but individuals are ineligible in case of a certain value of some observed 
instrumental variable. From a practical point of view this is a common setting, in 
particular for active labor market policies for young individuals.  In those cases, 
participation may be selective because individuals can choose between diﬀerent 
programs and/or because the duration until enrollment is not deterministically 
set.  Program participation is only possible if the individual is aged below a cer­
tain age. With selective participation, if the CIA is violated, matching cannot be 
used. For the same reason, one cannot simply compare those below the threshold 
who are treated to those above the threshold (who are all non-treated).  How­
ever, our novel method, which exploits the eligibility boundary restriction within 
the matching framework, provides consistent estimates of the average treatment 
eﬀect on those who are treated. 
Our approach relies critically on the availability of an instrument satisfying 
assumptions 1 and 2 in section 2. Assumption 2 is automatically satisﬁed in our 
preferred practical application of a policy that allows for selective participation 
only on certain values of an observed variable. To obtain precise estimates of our 
correction term, however, we also require the program to generate a reasonable 
number of participants. 
The application to the Swedish Youth Practice program shows that our method 
can deliver evaluation results that diﬀer from those based on standard matching 
methods. The matching estimates for the eﬀect on re-employment are sometimes 
signiﬁcantly positive, whereas the estimates based on our method are always in­
signiﬁcant.  The diﬀerence between the estimates is sometimes signiﬁcant.  The 
re-employment eﬀects are invariably estimated to be smaller than those based on 
matching, whereas for the eﬀects on the over-all exit probabilities out of unem­
ployment the reverse holds.  As a result, we are less optimistic about the eﬀect 
of subsidized work on the rate of ﬁnding work than if we had incorrectly based 
ourselves on the matching estimates, and we are more optimistic concerning the 
transition rate to other destinations.  From a policy point of view, our results 
suggest that perhaps an optimism about the use of subsidized work programs to 
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 bring unemployed youth back to work should be tempered.
 
An  additional  contribution  of  the  paper  concerns  the  performance  of  the 
matching method in the case of a sharp eligibility-discontinuity design.  Speciﬁ­
cally, we examine this for the New Deal for Young People program for unemployed 
youth aged below 25.  It turns out that matching is able to capture the assign­
ment  mechanism,  in  the  sense  that  the  estimates  based  on  matching  are  not 
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 Appendix:  Propensity score estimates 
Table 8 shows the estimates of the propensity score for the NDYP application. 
We tested the joint signiﬁcance of the groups of variables.  Only marital status 
and quarter of entrance are statistically signiﬁcant. Table 9 displays the estimates 
of the propensity score for the YP application.  Alternative speciﬁcations have 
been tried but do not change the nature of the results in both cases. 
Table 8: NDYP (part 1)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
constant  0.382  0.271 
Marital status: married  -0.004  0.075 
Marital status: divorced/widow  -0.397  0.125 
Marital status: unknown  -0.050  0.097 
U spells past year: none  -0.169  0.222 
U spells past year: 1  -0.154  0.204 
U spells past year: 2  -0.097  0.195 
U spells past year: 3  -0.116  0.197 
U spells past 2 years: none  0.089  0.212 
U spells past 2 years: 1  0.211  0.177 
U spells past 2 years: 2  0.248  0.154 
U spells past 2 years: 3  0.100  0.131 
U spells past 3 years: none  0.060  0.168 
U spells past 3 years: 1  -0.018  0.137 
U spells past 3 years: 2  -0.004  0.119 
U spells past 3 years: 3  -0.042  0.104 
% time in U past year  -0.111  0.186 
% time in U past 2 years  -0.265  0.321 
% time in U past 3 years  0.309  0.266 
Inﬂow in U: 97:IV  -0.257  0.203 
Inﬂow in U: 98:I  -0.476  0.206 
Inﬂow in U: 98:II  -0.364  0.207 
Inﬂow in U: 98:III  -0.402  0.207 
Inﬂow in U: 98:IV  -0.437  0.209 
(table continues next page) 
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 Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
Inﬂow in U: 99:I  -0.622  0.209 
Inﬂow in U: 99:II  -0.433  0.215 
Inﬂow in U: 99:III  -0.317  0.213 
Inﬂow in U: 99:IV  -0.396  0.219 
Inﬂow in U: 00:I  -0.441  0.218 
Inﬂow in U: 00:II  -0.572  0.235 
Inﬂow in U: 00:III  -0.431  0.222 
Inﬂow in U: 00:IV  -0.501  0.225 
Inﬂow in U: 01:I  -0.289  0.235 
Inﬂow in U: 01:II  -0.408  0.240 
Inﬂow in U: 01:III  -0.174  0.243 
Inﬂow in U: 01:IV  0.082  0.247 
Inﬂow in U: 02:I  -0.036  0.244 
Inﬂow in U: 02:II  -0.268  0.253 
Inﬂow in U: 02:III  -0.226  0.238 
Inﬂow in U: 02:IV  0.052  0.248 
Inﬂow in U: 03:I  -0.214  0.239 
Inﬂow in U: 03:II  -0.099  0.260 
Inﬂow in U: 03:III  -0.166  0.249 
Inﬂow in U: 03:IV  -0.280  0.246 
Region 2  0.039  0.105 
Region 3  0.088  0.108 
Region 4  0.003  0.114 
Region 5  -0.125  0.209 
Region 6  0.108  0.211 
Region 7  0.216  0.157 
Region 8  0.311  0.239 
(table continues next page) 
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 Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error
 
Region 9  0.007  0.166 
Region 10  -0.005  0.320 
Region 11  0.074  0.117 
Region 12  0.098  0.117 
Region 13  0.169  0.212 
Region 14  0.135  0.222 
Region 15  0.038  0.141 
Region 16  0.049  0.189 
Region 17  0.067  0.195 
Region 18  0.806  0.487 
Region 19  0.123  0.118 
Region 20  0.031  0.107 
Region 21  0.247  0.135 
Region 22  0.202  0.102 
Region 23  0.131  0.171 
Region 24  0.646  0.547 
Region 26  -0.062  0.217 
Region 27  0.270  0.280 
Region 28  -0.401  0.337 
Region 29  -0.054  0.123 
Region 30  0.024  0.244 
Region 31  -0.031  0.223 
Region 32  0.088  0.135 
Region 33  0.088  0.122 
Region 34  -0.073  0.155 
Region 35  -0.004  0.221 
Region 36  0.0587  0.136 









Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
Usual occupation 2  0.288  0.876 
Usual occupation 3  -0.226  0.284 
Usual occupation 4  0.640  0.296 
Usual occupation  -0.076  0.522 
Usual occupation 6  0.051  0.627 
Usual occupation 8  0.728  0.696 
Usual occupation 9  0.277  0.300 
Usual occupation  0.392  0.527 
Usual occupation 11  0.243  0.366 
Usual occupation 12  -0.261  0.230 
Usual occupation 14  -0.409  0.262 
Usual occupation  -0.281  0.364 
Usual occupation 17  -0.087  0.640 
Usual occupation 18  -0.086  0.902 
Usual occupation 19  -0.585  0.740 
Usual occupation  -0.492  0.345 
Usual occupation 21  -0.665  0.322 
Usual occupation 22  -0.180  0.274 
Usual occupation 24  -0.248  0.221 
Usual occupation  -0.268  0.318 
Usual occupation 26  -0.081  0.889 
Usual occupation 27  -0.119  0.930 
Usual occupation 28  0.032  0.151 
Usual occupation 29  -0.256  0.631 
Usual occupation  -0.683  0.512 
Usual occupation 31  -0.245  0.159 
Usual occupation 32  -0.146  0.278 
(table continues next page) 
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 Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
Usual occupation 33  0.021  0.120 
Usual occupation 34  0.128  0.124 
Usual occupation 35  0.017  0.532 
Usual occupation 36  -0.446  0.439 
Usual occupation 37  -0.024  0.367 
Usual occupation 38  -0.060  0.172 
Usual occupation 39  -0.384  0.255 
Usual occupation 40  -0.103  0.186 
Usual occupation 41  0.364  0.212 
Usual occupation 42  0.175  0.193 
Usual occupation 43  0.032  0.370 
Usual occupation 44  -0.136  0.486 
Usual occupation 45  0.204  0.245 
Usual occupation 47  -0.234  0.245 
Usual occupation 48  -0.008  0.640 
Usual occupation 49  0.153  0.193 
Usual occupation 50  -0.212  0.143 
Usual occupation 52  -0.467  0.232 
Usual occupation 53  0.306  0.296 
Usual occupation 54  0.094  0.359 
Usual occupation 55  0.476  0.755 
Usual occupation 57  -0.046  0.893 
Usual occupation 58  -0.039  0.158 
Usual occupation 59  0.033  0.102 
(table continues next page) 
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 Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
Usual occupation 60  -0.540  0.784 
Usual occupation 61  -0.097  0.443 
Usual occupation 62  0.304  0.401 
Usual occupation 63  -0.614  0.228 
Usual occupation 64  -0.419  0.252 
Usual occupation 66  -0.897  0.476 
Usual occupation 67  -0.243  0.248 
Usual occupation 68  -0.082  0.179 
Usual occupation 69  -0.325  0.163 
Usual occupation 70  -0.189  0.328 
Usual occupation 71  0.023  0.280 
Usual occupation 72  -0.184  0.325 
Usual occupation 73  -0.179  0.084 
Usual occupation 74  -0.276  0.118 
Usual occupation 75  0.177  0.349 
Usual occupation 76  -0.339  0.747 
Usual occupation 77  0.018  0.181 
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 Table 9: YP (part 1)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
constant  -1.455(*)  .042 
Region 3  -.198(*)  .062 
Region 4  -.069  .056 
Region 5  .133(*)  .044 
Region 6  .023  .053 
Region 7  .157(*)  .063 
Region 8  .161(*)  .054 
Region 9  -.310(*)  .143 
Region 10  .285(*)  .063 
Region 11  -.037  .033 
Region 12  .162(*)  .055 
Region 13  .079(*)  .029 
Region 14  .165(*)  .048 
Region 15  .048  .054 
Region 16  .169(*)  .051 
Region 17  .202(*)  .048 
Region 18  -.018  .053 
Region 19  .086  .053 
Region 20  .035  .067 
Region 21  -.181(*)  .056 
Highest educational achievement 
secondary level  .078(*)  .037 
vocational education  .056(*)  .024 
university  .037  .034 
(table continues next page) 
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 Table 9: YP (cont.)
 
covariates  coeﬃcient  st. error 
Unemployment history (**) 
% time in U over last year  .258(*)  .081 
% time in U over last 2 years  .170  .106 
% time in T over last year  .175  .104 
% time in T over last 2 years  .156  .117 
% time in YP over last year  .772(*)  .188 
% time in YP over last 2 years  .267  .271 
% time in E over last year  -.444(*)  .216 
% time in E over last 2 years  .098  .336 
Quarter of inﬂow into unemployment 
quarter II  -.205(*)  .031 
quarter III  -.093(*)  .030 
quarter IV  -.110(*)  .032 
Year of inﬂow into unemployment 
1993  -.268(*)  .027 
1994  -.464(*)  .035 
1995  -1.657(*)  .157 
Notes:  Estimates  from  a  probit  regression  of  the  participation 
dummy  variable  on  all  observables  except  age  using  57431  obser­
vations in total. 
(*) Statistically diﬀerent from zero at the conventional 5% signiﬁ­
cance level. 
(**) U stands for unemployment, T stands for treatment other then 
YP,  YP  stands  for  Youth  Practice  and  E  stands  for  employment. 
Individuals may have had previous YP spells from open unemploy­
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